

ON THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND 1989 EASTERN EUROPE AS HARBINGER

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As the cliché goes, history does not repeat, but it does rhyme. Thirty-five years ago the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed overnight, something that nobody in the West had foreseen. It turned out, contrary to the firm conclusion of all our vaunted intelligence apparatuses, that every one of those regimes was a paper tiger. When faced with determined resistance from the population, their rulers simply folded their cards, rather than using force to retain power. That much is history, but it raises an important question—what does this imply for the most repressive totalitarian regime in the West, a lineal successor of those dead Communist regimes, today's United Kingdom?

The ruling class in the UK is the first Western ruling class in a hundred years to face the same problem faced by Eastern European Communist regimes in 1989—the extreme dissatisfaction of much of the population, with a large percentage of that population having concluded their dissatisfaction can never be resolved through the parliamentary system, so-called democracy. (The last Western regime to face this problem was the Weimar Republic.) The Communist regimes fell in 1989 because they lacked the will to put down massive spontaneous public protests led almost exclusively by previously-unknown men. This had precedent—in the most spectacular example, thirty years before, in 1956 Hungary, the exact same thing happened, but there the regional hegemon, the Soviet Union, stepped in with the required violence, which it refused to do in 1989. Thus this path to regime collapse, as well as what a regime must do to avoid collapse, is well-demonstrated. Does the UK regime lack the necessary will in the face of mass protest, violent or not, as well? We cannot know unless and until there are such protests. But my purpose here is to analyze the current situation and what might happen.

First, we should define “regime,” and how it relates to “the Regime,” a term frequently used on the Right. That latter I have elsewhere precisely defined, but in short, it means the ruling class of the entire West, Gaetano Mosca's governing and non-governing elite, devoted wholeheartedly for seventy years or more to leftist ideology and power at any price. Within the past six months, certainly, the unitary nature of

that overarching Regime has been, if not fractured, extensively damaged by Donald Trump. Not by his mere election, but rather because America has always been the leader and guiding force of the Regime, and Trump's unexpected willingness to actually use power to achieve ends antithetical to the Regime, combined with his equally unexpected ability to attract large numbers of highly competent assistants in this project, has led to disarray among the Regime's many tentacles.

What will result from this unprecedented ferment is anybody's guess, but it undoubtedly means both that the power of the Regime over the West as whole (and even more so over America) has been weakened, at least temporarily and probably permanently, and that the longstanding role of America's ruling class in guiding and enforcing adherence to Regime dictates across the West has greatly diminished. When both the President and Vice President of the United States regularly excoriate their supposed peers in other nations, something that has never before happened, the astute observer sits up and takes notice. Certainly the myrmidons of the Regime plot their return to total power, but with every day that passes, what power they retain erodes.

The result is that the junior ruling classes in the Regime, those of Western Europe, each itself a "regime," have been forced more than before to defend themselves against their own disgruntled people using their own resources. When the reach of a regime diminishes, the will to power of its members also tends to diminish, because in the same way that nothing succeeds like success, nothing weakens like failure, which feeds on itself and spreads fear among the individuals who constitute the regime. In Eastern Europe, Soviet weakness, the result of Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to shore up the Communist system, along with economic fragility and the simple playing out of Communist ideology, exposed as fundamentally fraudulent, undercut the ruling classes' will. The UK regime is today facing a similar dynamic. It is certainly just as incompetent, if not more so, in both cases largely the inevitable result of Left ideology, and likely (though one can never know until the moment of decision) just as fragile.

Second, let's discuss the totalitarian nature of the UK regime. We have been propagandized for decades with the lie that what characterizes the West is "freedom," which are meant to conclude means the right of each man to express his opinions and act on them politically.

As Ryszard Legutko ably demonstrated, none of this has been true for a long time. In the past thirty-five years, the ideology and practice of Western regimes has instead followed a trajectory bringing them into a close parallel with those fallen Communist regimes. Our rulers discard the tired old Marxist cant, but the same essential guiding principles of the Left, emancipation and forced egalitarianism in service of achieving a utopian future, always gain more and more power over the daily lives of the people. Legutko coined the phrase “coercion to freedom” for this process, which is on full display in today’s UK—although Legutko wrote before the regimes of the West added to their many offenses the worst of all, the deliberate replacement of the indigenous population of their nations by the importation of tens of millions of alien invaders.

Nowhere is this process of increasing Left dominance through the naked exercise of power more noticeable and accelerating faster than in the UK. What makes this possible is that the UK is a prototypical example of the usual governing system of the West’s modern regimes—a uniparty system masquerading as a parliamentary democracy. The structural mechanism used to maintain uniparty power, totally aside from the specifics of ideology, is something Carl Schmitt identified as an inevitable fatal defect of parliamentary democracies—the constant temptation of those in power to deny, by any means necessary, “equal chance” to any actual challenge to their power. The UK has a uniparty, the Labor-Tory alliance. And no matter how the indigenous population of Britain votes, the result is always the same—advancing the causes of the Left on every front.

This effect is most visible, again, in the millions of invading migrants ushered into the country by the UK regime over the past decade (though it began in the 1950s) in order to replace the indigenous population with reliable clients, at the same time advancing the bred-in-the-bone anti-white hatred of the modern Left. The Tories, for example, promised for fifteen years to reduce immigration to a few tens of thousands, and then gleefully invited millions of Third World parasites. But it is also visible in many other recent actions of the UK’s uniparty. One is the legalizing of so-called euthanasia and partial-birth abortion, and the criminalizing of any form of protest in response, including completely silent prayer within a wide radius around abortuaries. Another is the lowering of the voting age to sixteen. The UK regime is well aware that that the

under-twenty age group is historically the easiest to propagandize into unthinking action, and with other tools implemented by the regime, they hope to avoid any self-education, while ensuring total indoctrination of the young through limiting their ability to access anything but media and education controlled by the Left (the real explanation for the recent push for age verification for use of social media, and the attacks on Facebook a few years back astroturfed, funded by, and coordinated by the British secret police). And, most of all, it is visible in the so-called Online Safety Act, which went into effect just a few weeks ago, a joint project of Labor and the Tories.

The Online Safety Act is a condensed symbol of everything about and everything bad about the regimes which rule the West. It is utterly mendacious, in that it claims to be directed against controlling child pornography, so that any opposition can be cast as being “against children,” but its real goal is censoring any activity, especially online activity, that might threaten the Regime’s desired narratives or allow opposition to the Regime to organize—most of all any opposition to the migrant invasion. It is perfectly totalitarian, in that it is planned to control every aspect of the population’s lives with the aim of monitoring and governing both their actions and their thoughts. It is designed, in the modern way, to require all media companies to act as arms of the totalitarian state, under penalty of fines of ten percent of global revenue (not profit) and prison sentences for those who refuse to do exactly what they are told exactly when they are told (in total secrecy, naturally). To be sure, however, the existence of the OSA is itself evidence that the UK regime understands the danger it is in, and we will return to this.

The totalitarianism of today’s UK is more extensive than that of any Eastern European communist regime after the 1950s, and perhaps even compared to that decade. Any person in the UK not fully in agreement with the regime must constantly evaluate whether what he says, in any forum, including in private conversations, may lead to his arrest and imprisonment. In the UK (as well as other Western regimes, such as that of Germany, though those are beyond the scope of this article, but subject to much the same basic analysis) the government devotes great and ever-increasing resources to curbing dissent. UK regular police, wholly dominated by the Left and staffed with large numbers of migrants recruited by the state to keep the native population down,

together with the many various branches of the UK secret police, a modern Stasi, directly threaten many thousands of their citizens every month, and arrest more than a thousand, for any opposition to the Regime online (and in any other forum as well). They rarely, and never for speech, threaten or arrest regime clients, such as the millions of Third World blacks and browns they have imported to Britain, who are encouraged to terrorize white Britons, the exclusive target of the regime. These police actions are rapidly increasing, and will doubtless explode as a result of the Online Safety Act, though exact numbers are carefully concealed by the government. This is done to achieve a multiplier effect, where the population cowers in uncertainty and fear, never knowing when the pounding on the door at four in the morning will come.

In Eastern Europe, by contrast, private lives were essentially ignored, Left doctrine was not aggressively advanced in most areas of life, and mild public dissent was generally tolerated, with the main tool of suppressing dissent being that someone seen as an excessively vocal enemy of the regime would have trouble getting a decent job (this happened to some of my relatives in Hungary). Even though I have close English relations, and have spent a great deal of time in England, I would hesitate today to visit, given that I am no doubt in some database as an enemy of the state, though not a very important one. (Maybe this article will move me up the list.) For a native Englishman opposed to the Regime, he must modify his life to comply with regime demands more than any Eastern European did in the 1970s or 1980s—even compared to a citizen of the more repressive Communist regimes, such as Rumania or Albania. And the UK is moving backward, becoming increasingly totalitarian as time passes, rather than less—perhaps the correct historical comparison is to Eastern Europe around 1946 or 1947, before total Communist domination took hold.

In the UK, what is, for now, openly called two-tier justice is the explicit policy of the state. (Hence the bitter nickname for the current Uniparty prime minister, Keir Starmer, “Two-Tier Keir.”) Last year the UK issued new criminal sentencing guidelines directing that harsher sentences be meted out to whites, especially men and Christians, for any and all crimes. The guidelines were temporarily suspended at the last minute, true, but you can be certain that in practice they are fully in effect, as an expression of the will of the ruling class, and you can

also be certain that whites are always aggressively investigated and prosecuted while crimes, orders of magnitude greater per capita, by the regime's shock troop blacks and browns are ignored. No better example exists than the Paki rape gangs, who exclusively rape white girls, which operate freely in many English cities, but it is an error to only focus on the most shocking examples, when the same principle pervades the entire "justice" system. In response to resulting outrage expressed by native Britons, a few weeks ago the UK police announced that any social media posts using the term "two-tier" would be "flagged"—that is, posters would be investigated and targeted for punishment. This is being done by the secret police—more precisely, by a new National Internet Intelligence Investigations team under a new National Police Coordination Centre. We can be certain these freshly grown tentacles of the secret police will rapidly expand their suppression of dissent in the coming weeks and months.

It is sometimes pointed out, correctly, that the totalitarian regimes of today's West do not rule with the same brutality exhibited by past totalitarian regimes. Stalin killed millions and imprisoned tens of millions for years. Our Western regimes, so far, kill only a few people and imprison thousands, not millions, mostly "only" for months or a few years. Yet this comparison is not really the correct one. The period of extreme terror for Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, in particular, was fairly brief, a decade or less. The UK today holds more political prisoners than did any Eastern European regime in the 1970s or 1980s (as did the United States, until the ascension of Trump). And as I say, within five years, on its current trajectory, the UK regime will also be torturing and killing its opponents out of hand (though it is also possible the hyper-feminization of Western regimes combined with the powers possible through modern technology may result in less brutal yet equally coercive measures being used instead—in this, as in much else, our present moment is unprecedented and therefore not wholly predictable).

On to the main event—analyzing whether the UK is likely to follow the path of 1989 Eastern Europe. I have previously, through the lens of Stephen Kotkin's *Uncivil Society*, fully analyzed how and why the Eastern European regimes fell, through the mechanism of a cascading failure of confidence, a "political bank run," in the face of mass protests, and

I will not repeat that analysis here. But street protests had taken place before in these Communist countries, some very recently, all put down successfully by violence. What was different this time was extreme regime fragility, and the two immediate drivers of that, other than simple longstanding incompetence and sclerosis, were the refusal of the Soviet Union to backstop a violent crackdown, and the economic Ponzi scheme, based on the borrowing of hard currency from the West, in which all these Communist regimes had engaged.

Still, there are a few persistent myths about the events of 1989, which we should briefly demolish, because such fantasies cloud analysis of possible future events. First, it is not true that those who ruled under those regimes led, guided, or had any role whatsoever in the processes that led to the end of their power. Some claim, no doubt seeking to show how they are special because they understand the real hidden drivers of history (gnosticism is a common malady on the Right), that it was all planned, and that the Communist leaders simply decided on their own to rework their systems and retain power, and either manipulated protests to this end, or used protests to execute their desired goal. This is completely false, as shown by that nobody ever offers actual evidence for this theory (and one offshoot of this claim, that Communist leaders were not true believers but rather pretended to be, is equally false, and easily demonstrated to be false). Sometimes this fantasy is coupled with the equally silly idea that ending the regimes was done in cooperation with Western elements who wanted to get an economic or social foothold in Eastern Europe, again never identified because they did not exist, but usually implied to be some shadowy combination of George Soros and the JOOOOOZ generally.

Now, it is true that after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, in one case (Rumania) almost all the same people retained power for more than a decade, and that in the 1990s, Western Regime elements such as Soros acted in an extremely pernicious manner in all of Eastern Europe, both in introducing and financing the spread of globohomo Left ideology in the area, and in cutting economic deals that benefitted Westerners. But none of that was a glimmer in anyone's eye in 1989.

Second, it is not true that the people protested because they wanted blue jeans and rock music—that protests were driven by the desire for more consumer goods or a wish for a fuller expression of pop culture.

Those who risked their lives to protest wanted God, the nation, and traditional ways of life, in that order. They got none of those, true, thanks to the Regime in the West shoring up the Left in all these countries from 1990 onward, but that is another story.

In passing, I note we should also be careful to distinguish the end of Communism in Eastern Europe from the end of Communism in the Soviet Union. These are different cases, although linked in that the refusal of Gorbachev to either demand that Eastern European regimes put down their revolts by force, or to offer any support for such harsh action (the very opposite of the Soviet response in Hungary in 1956), ensured the fall of those regimes. The Soviet Union ended because true believers in Communism tried to reform a system that could not be reformed, with massive debt and a sclerotic economy, and reaped the consequences of their actions. In somewhat of a historical parallel, we can see that America is not going to play the role of the Soviet Union for the UK, at least under Trump or any Trumpist successor, which means, again, that the regimes of the totalitarian West are on their own, just like those of 1989 Eastern Europe.

How might the fall of the UK regime play out? In Eastern Europe, there was no single trigger, no one outrage, merely the accumulated unhappiness of the populace, combined with a growing feeling that matters could be made better (rising expectations always play a major role in such events). In the UK, by contrast, the regime continually offers outrages to its population in a manner that Eastern European regimes did not. After all, those regimes were run by people, for the most part, especially by the 1980s, who felt themselves part of the nation. While they were very focused on their own gain and comfort, it would never have occurred to them to take actions deliberately harmful to the people as a whole, such as import millions of aliens and encourage their crimes against the indigenous populace. Thus, the most likely scenario in the UK triggering protests against the regime is spontaneous native reaction to some migrant outrage. Given that such outrages are a dime a dozen, and that on more than one occasion minor local unrest has already erupted as a result, with the regime harshly cracking down to prevent spread, this seems very likely. Another, related, possibility is the native population reacting to attempts by invaders, feeling their oats and desirous of retaining their privileged position, to violently

keep the indigenous British population in line, something increasingly encouraged by the stretched-thin thugs of the regime.

It takes no imagination at all, and in fact it seems to be possible every week of late, to conceive of rapid contagion as a result of some such outrage, with young men (it is always the young men, often encouraged by their women) coming out into the streets, peacefully or not, having finally had enough. As the UK economy declines, moreover, such events are ever more likely; hunger and lack of opportunity inevitably play into the mix. Undoubtedly, the initial reaction of the regime, a playbook already often used in the past century in many different places, would be violent suppression combined with a clampdown on sources of information.

This suppression will fail. The technological panopticon, often pointed to as a crucial element of modern totalitarian control, is mostly a mirage. Especially in cities, it is impossible to control the flow of information by person-to-person contact. Kotkin demonstrates the spontaneous creation of what he labels “niches”—small circles of like-minded friends and associates, communicating in person. Such nimble, informal groups were essentially immune to attack, infiltration, or any kind of counter-measure, and through these information about what was actually happening, as opposed to what could be heard in the regime media, could be found. Moreover, the all-encompassing censorship of social media will have little impact in such a situation. The Communist regimes spent a great deal of time and resources trying to make sure their opponents felt they were alone and isolated, and failed utterly.

Certainly, many average citizens will both not have any online knowledge of whatever precipitated the protests, and will believe the usual hysterical regime propaganda about the “wreckers and racists” who are “fomenting hatred.” But many will have knowledge and will not believe because of person-to-person contact, and in any case it is always a minority who engage in protests—initial participation by, or even acceptance of, the majority is not necessary and rarely, if ever, happens. In fact, technology will make the protests more likely and more organized relative to 1989, because anyone willing to engage in a protest will be well aware of technological workarounds to censorship, such as encrypted messaging. The regime might, in desperation,

entirely shut down the internet, but that will also be ineffective once matters are already begun.

All repressive governments fear street protests, because they know, either from history or from instinct, that protests are extremely dangerous for their rule. This, not any of their stated reasons, is why the American Regime foamed at the mouth with rage, based in existential fear, against the heroes of the January 6th Electoral Justice Protest, and why the Canadian regime went into, and still engages in, spasms of panic in response to the extremely mild protests of the Freedom Convoy. However, it is important to specify that protests adequate to offer an existential challenge, even to a regime widely recognized as weak and illegitimate, require substantial numbers. Protests in Leipzig, which began the domino effect in Eastern Europe, involved 100,000 people (a sudden spontaneous increase, probably tied to perceived change in the Soviet Union, after years of small church-based candlelight vigils, which were explicitly organized to not defy the regime, and thus were called "peace vigils" by their organizers).

The power of a protest is multiplied by the perceived willingness of the protestors to engage in violence, either outward-focused or in self-defense. In fact, the likely effectiveness of protests is best analyzed as a matrix. On one axis is the will of the regime, strong to weak. On the other axis is the size of protests combined with their apparent or actual willingness to turn to open revolt. The combination of a fragile, wavering regime with large violent protests inevitably results in regime collapse. In 1956 Hungary, at the start of the march that began the Revolution (when the government fired on the protestors), it took only a matter of minutes for the chanted slogans of the crowd to change from mild acceptable phrases to "Rákosi [the Party head] into the Danube!" On the other end, a strong regime willing to use force ranged against smaller protests unwilling to threaten force inevitably results in protest failure. In between cases—ah, there are the uncertainties!

Thus if, for example, a hundred thousand people marched in London demanding an end to migrant outrages and the state replacement of indigenous Britons with foreigners, along with the deportation of all migrants by force, the regime will face a difficult choice, exactly analogous to 1989 Eastern Europe. It will be unable to ignore such an event, and will have to decide whether to use major force—that resulting in

deaths—to suppress it. It cannot ignore the protest, because its very existence is a challenge to a weak regime's legitimacy, and because at any moment it may turn to open rebellion. The regime's initial reaction will be to use non-lethal violence to disperse crowds and then to arrest and imprison many of people involved; this has already been done recently with success against minor protests. But those tools will have very definite limits of effectiveness, especially because protests are always contagious, and will rapidly spread to other urban centers.

The UK has relatively few policemen (about seventy-five thousand), and of those, many are women, completely useless to the regime in any scenario involving violence. It has more secret police, but such men (and again many useless women) are bureaucrats at heart, whose organizations exist to inform the regime and execute its orders in the shadows, not fight in the streets. Secret police always evanesce, seeking their own survival, if the regime itself lacks the will to use force (in Hungary, the secret police kept spare uniforms of the regular police on hand for just such a contingency). And the UK's military, the supposed final boss in situations of revolt, is both small, again filled with women, and, in the usual manner of Western militaries, any soldier with actual experience of violence likely would support, at least to some degree, the protestors. Aliens in the military might engage in freelance violence to support their co-ethnics against a perceived threat, but that would worsen the regime's problems, not solve them.

The UK regime, like all sclerotic ideological regimes, is incapable of changing course through, for example, engaging in deportations of the most recent migrants, while insisting that others stay in the UK. Half a loaf is not in their vocabulary, so they will have none. They will instead, as did the Hungarian regime in 1956, croak the same empty slogans dictated by their ideology, attacking protestors with the same tired labels that nobody who matters will care about. Racist! White supremacist! Nativist! This would have zero effect; the regime would still face the fundamental choice of suppressing protests with violence, or folding their cards in the same way as did the regimes of 1989.

If the regime responds with increased violence, it might succeed in suppressing the protests, in a replay of 1953 Berlin, 1956 Hungary, and 1968 Czechoslovakia. Such a response is not likely, however. The UK regime is very aware of its precarious position; most of its efforts are

directed to preventing the inception of any revolt of the people. Their planning probably does not go beyond this, and as I say, the tools they have to accomplish violence are weak at best. Nor can they look for help from the Regime hegemon, America. The current American government would certainly not support the UK regime. Compelling images of the dead and dying killed by the regime would circulate freely outside of Britain, further undermining the regime (thanks to the breaking of worldwide online censorship resulting both from the freeing of X by Elon Musk and the ascension of Trump, though many platforms such as YouTube and Facebook would eagerly aid the UK ruling class). I would bet money that in this scenario those who make up the UK regime will simply leave their desks and head for the exits.

What happens if not? That is anybody's guess. The UK might descend into civil war; this is probably the most likely scenario, given the extreme divisions within UK society combined with millions of aliens perching like vultures on British soil. Those divisions are much greater than those in 1989 Eastern Europe, because the UK regime has attempted to destroy the historic British people entirely. When, as Schmitt pointed out, "the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence," existential enmity and therefore war is the almost inevitable result. Alternatively, a Caesar figure might arise who would restore order and the primacy of the native British, through force of will backed by rapid militarization of native sons, thereby quelling a nascent civil war. In the unique circumstances of the UK, this might be someone in the monarchical line of succession, as unlikely as this seems given the pusillanimity of Charles III and the apparent pusillanimity of his son William. In addition, the UK would almost certainly see foreign involvement in any conflict. The Russians would no doubt be happy to return the favor of the UK regime attempting to destroy their country. The Chinese would be happy to add to any chaos. The Americans might (and certainly should) arm the rebels. Who can say? That's why history is so interesting.

True, it might not go this way. Predictions are a fool's errand, and I predicted massive violence initiated by the Left in America after the 2024 election, none of which came to pass (yet, at least). An instructive recent counter-example is the experience of the Yellow Vests in France

six years ago, a series of protests, so-called because of the yellow traffic warning vests worn by protestors. While the protests went on for more than a year, the French regime managed to use moderate violence, primarily the use of less-lethal munitions that still resulted in many mutilations, to curb the protests.

I don't think the Yellow Vests are a determinative counter-example. Curtis Yarvin, whom contrary to the impression of many I greatly respect (despite quite a few disagreements with him) has pointed out that the Yellow Vests failed because they placed self-imposed guardrails on themselves. Most of all, they refused to engage in any violence. Yarvin thinks non-violence is inherent in the people of the modern West, "those people just don't exist anymore." But he is wrong, because human nature, and most of all the nature of young men faced with the negation of their way of life, never changes.

In addition, the Yellow Vests exhibited many other weaknesses. They were primarily a rural movement, with a limited suburban component, focused on taxation and economic disadvantages imposed by the state on those not living in cities, especially fuel taxes. Cities are always where protests matter, because concentrated force can be focused on the regime's centers of power and that is where the regime's leaders live, and taxes are rarely, of themselves, the spur to truly mass action. Another major defect of the Yellow Vests was decentralization. All successful protests require recognized leaders, and the Yellow Vests foolishly continually rejected this, deeming it elitist and therefore counter to their desired populist message. It is false, however, that protests require leaders who are already members of the elite (a claim pushed, again, by gnostics who believe the dumb myth that all political change is merely conflict among existing elites). In the nature of things, men who are leaders arise in any movement, from children's games to war. But if such leaders are not recognized and obeyed because of some silly abstract principle, protest action becomes entirely chaotic and the rank-and-file are uncertain what to do, leading to failure.

Yet another defect was that the Yellow Vests never engaged in adequately large protests. The largest individual protests were a few thousand people (though collectively up to 80,000 across the country at a time in some instances); real protests require real numbers. But the biggest single defect of the Yellow Vests was that they were not

threatening enough, especially given the militarized nature of French police and the strength of will of the French regime. On my matrix, the state was too resolute and the Yellow Vests were too weak (probably in part because on the Continent the people lack the tradition of ordered liberty that has existed for centuries in Britain, which means rebellions have always been limited to those driven by extremist ideology, usually of the left). This is not to say that the French lack the ability to revolt; no Western people lacks that capacity. But it does mean that the Yellow Vests would have had to bring a lot more to the table to threaten the stability of the French regime.

In any case, while the total overthrow of the UK regime, followed by the punishment of its members (not only prison or worse, but confiscation of assets, rustication or exile, and lustration), is a consummation devoutly to be wished, we should not be overconfident or approach the possibilities in a facile manner. There are many relevant differences between the UK of 2025 and the Eastern Europe of 1989. In those Communist societies, perhaps ten percent of the population supported the regime—only those with a direct personal stake in the regime's survival. In the UK, by contrast, it is more likely thirty to forty percent, both leftist true believers and migrants who have already invaded, as well as the usual regime apparatchiks. This suggests war among the populace, maybe with the regime directly participating, maybe after the regime itself disappears.

Other differences include a hugely feminized society, which has never characterized any society that successfully overthrew, or even tried to overthrow, a repressive regime. That society is also very degraded and at least appears passive as a result of drugs and entertainment. And indigenous Britons are an aging population that has failed to reproduce itself adequately. That last may not be determinative, because it is the young who initiate protests, which quickly develop a life of their own. But it does make it more difficult to accomplish the goal, because the old are generally fearful.

On the other hand, just because the English haven't revolted in centuries doesn't mean they won't now; past performance is no guarantee of future results. Some point out that civil disobedience only works if the regime approves what those engaging in disobedience demand. True enough—but what will come is not civil disobedience, it is mass protests

with a thread of violence. Traditional civil disobedience—peaceful non-compliance with laws; work stoppages; general strikes—is not what the UK regime faces or fears. Along similar lines, it is true that the Floyd Riots were successful and not put down by force as they should have been because the Regime approved of them, but it does not follow that protests in actual opposition to a regime cannot succeed, as 1989 proves.

What will likely worsen the conflict is that the UK regime has its back against the wall—its members cannot, in practice, emigrate except as beggars. Moreover, because of their great crimes, they correctly fear that if they relinquish power, unlike the Communists in Eastern Europe, they will be extremely lucky if loss of power and property is the worst that happens to them. They have no hope of dominating or profiting from a future regime. Thus, a few street protests, even large ones, may not be enough; the bigger the obstacle, after all, the harder the push needed.

It is certainly possible instead that none of this will happen, that Britain will simply sink beneath the waves and disappear, with the lands of Albion becoming a mere extension of the Third World. It would then become another of the very many countries of the world aptly characterized by Trump, with his gift for the felicitous phrase, as shit-holes. It might end as does *The Camp of the Saints*, only on the other side of the Channel, a filthy, stinking place to be. That would be sad—but also inevitable, if the natives of Britain do not step up, make the hard choices, and do the hard things. With any luck, they will.